Trust Center Updates
Title: SOC 2 Type II report issued
Category: Compliance Update
Status: Issued
Daytona's SOC 2 Type II examination is complete. Insight Assurance issued the report
on July 28, 2026 with an unqualified opinion covering the period December 16, 2025
through March 15, 2026, across the Security, Availability, and Confidentiality Trust
Services Criteria.
Type I, which we held previously, assessed whether our controls were suitably
designed at a single point in time. Type II tests whether those controls operated
effectively across a defined period. This report covers the control environment for
the Daytona AI Runtime Platform, including access control, change management,
logging and monitoring, incident response, and vendor management.
What this means for you
No action is required. Customers and prospects can request the full report through
this trust center, where it sits alongside our SOC 2 Type I report and HIPAA
attestation. Existing agreements and BAAs are unaffected.
More
Request the report: https://trust.daytona.io/
Questions: security@daytona.io
Title: CVE-2026-31431 ("Copy Fail") — Linux kernel page cache write primitive, fully remediated
Category: Security Advisory
Severity: High
Status: Resolved
Notify subscribers: Yes
On April 29, 2026, a Linux kernel vulnerability (CVE-2026-31431, "Copy Fail") was publicly disclosed in the authencesn AEAD cryptographic template, reachable from userspace via the AF_ALG socket interface (algif_aead). The flaw allows an unprivileged process to perform a deterministic, controlled write into the kernel page cache without modifying anything on disk. On multi-tenant hosts, this creates a theoretical path for one sandbox to corrupt cached file content visible to co-tenant sandboxes. All Daytona infrastructure was fully remediated within 12 hours of disclosure. We have no evidence of exploitation, and the Sysbox runtime isolation boundary was not breached.
Am I affected?
No action is required. Daytona infrastructure is fully remediated across all regions.
Yes, your environment was in scope for the mitigation if you were running sandboxes on Daytona between April 29 and April 30, 2026 — but remediation was applied automatically without customer action.
What we did
- Patched the Linux kernel where available.
- Blacklisted the
algif_aeadmodule on hosts as an immediate, defense-in-depth mitigation. - Rotated all API credentials associated with runner infrastructure as a precaution.
- Paused all new user and organization signups during the active response window; signups have since resumed.
More
Full write-up: https://www.daytona.io/dotfiles/updates/security-update-cve-2026-31431-copy-fail
Questions: security@daytona.io
Title: API credential exposure in sandboxes — patched, rotation required if affected
Category: Security Advisory
Severity: High
Status: Resolved
Notify subscribers: Yes
On April 9, 2026, we patched a vulnerability that allowed API credentials passed via the Daytona CLI or SDK to be read from sandbox memory by anyone with shell access on the same sandbox. The fix was deployed and verified in every region the same day in under five hours from disclosure to full remediation. We have no evidence of exploitation.
Am I affected?
Yes, if you used the CLI or SDK to authenticate to a sandbox launched from the default snapshot (or a custom snapshot that still had sudo) at any point before April 9, 2026, 20:44 UTC.
No, if your sandboxes only run on custom snapshots without sudo or root.
What to do
If you're in scope, rotate any API keys, service account keys, and CI/CD credentials that were used in the affected window. Rotation lives in the dashboard under Settings → API Keys.
Then review your audit logs for that same window for any sandbox operations, key usage, or admin actions you can't attribute to a known source. If anything looks off, email security@daytona.io.
A successful exploit would look identical to normal API traffic in our logs, so we can't prove a clean negative. Please treat rotation as required, not precautionary.
More
Full write-up: Security Advisory: API Credential Exposure in Sandboxes
Questions: security@daytona.io


